Patton Leaver and Marge Leaver v. Ruth Grose : Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1977
Patton Leaver and Marge Leaver v. Ruth Grose :
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellants
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Leaver v. Grose, No. 14722 (Utah Supreme Court, 1977).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/462
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PATTON LEAVER and MARGE 
LEAVER, 
Plaintiff-Appellants, 
vs. Case No. 14722 
RUTH GROSE, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to enforce restrictive covenants 
of a subdivision located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and to enjoin the respondent from utilizing a residence 
located in that subdivision as a duplex dwelling. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Subsequent to the filing of the COJ!l>laint and answer 
in this action, plaintiff-appellants moved for partial summary 
judgment that certain restrictive covenants applicable to the 
defendant-respondent's property were enforceable and still in 
effect. (R. p. 17) 
After hearing on plaintiff-appellants' motion, 
Judge Marcellus K. Snow denied plaintiff-appellants' motion 
for partial summary judgment and on July 27, 1976, entered 
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an order that the "Building Restrictions of Loganview Sub-
division" were not enforceable as to any violation of those 
restrictions committed after May 12, 1972. (R. p. 30) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-appellants ask that the judgment of the 
Lower Court be reversed and this matter remanded with directions 
that the restrictive covenants in question in this matter are 
in full force and effect and that a trial be held to determine 
the merits of the defendant-respondent's defenses raised in 
her answer. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants conunenced an action on May 11, 1976, in 
the District court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, seeking 
to enjoin the use of the property adjacent to their home, and 
owned by the respondent, from being utilized as a duplex 
dwelling. Both the residence of the appellants and that 
of the respondent are located within the boundaries of "Logan· 
view Subdivision" in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
On May 12, 194 7, "Building Restrictions" restricting 
the use of certain properties in Loganview Subdivision to 
single-family residences were filed in the office of the 
Salt Lake County Recorder. Both appellants and respondent 
purchased their respective properties subsequent to May 12, 
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1947. Prior to the filing of the appellants' complaint in 
the Court below, the respondent commenced alterations upon 
her property with the intent to convert and utilize that 
dwelling as a duplex. 
On July 6, 1976, appellants moved for partial 
summary judgment on the issue of the enforceability of the 
"Building Restrictions". The District Court denied appellants' 
motion for partial summary judgment and entered what constitutes 
summary judgment in behalf of the respondent that the restrictions 
could not be enforced by the appellants since the actions 
complained of occurred after May 12, 1972, (twenty-five years 
after the "Building Restrictions" were originally filed) and 
that the respondent did not have notice that the restric-tions 
were still in full force and effect after May 12, 1972. (~. p. 30) 
The plaintiff-appellants appeal from the ruling of 
Judge Snow upon the grounds that the building restrictions 
were properly filed and the defendant-respondent had constructive 
notice of those restrictions and that the Lawer Court erred in 
ruling the restrictive covenants had expired on May 12, 1972. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE DEFENDANT HAD NOTICE OF THE 
COVENANTS RESTRICTING THE USE OF 
HER PROPERTY TO A "SINGLE-FAMILY 
RESIDENCE". 
-3-
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The following set of facts is undisputed in this 
action: 
1. That restrictive covenants (R. pps. 20-22) 
were duly filed in the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office 
on May 12, 1947. 
2. The real property owned by the appellants and 
the respondent were subject to those restrictions at the 
time of the filing. (Plaintiff's Conq:>laint, paragraph 2, 
R. p. 2: Defendant's Answer, paragraph 2, R. p. 11) 
3. That the plaintiffs and defendant both acquired 
their respective properties subsequent to May 12, 1947. 
The statutory provisions that the Lower Court was 
required to apply to such facts are found in §57-3-2, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953): 
Every conveyance, or instrument in 
writing affecting real estate, 
executed, acknowledged or approved, 
and certified, in the manner pre-
scribed by this title, and every 
patent to lands within this state 
duly executed and verified according 
to law, and every judgment, order 
or decree of any court of record 
in this state, or a copy thereof, 
required by law to be recorded in 
the Office of the County Recorder 
shall, from the time of filing the 
same with the Recorder for record, 
impart notice to all persons of the 
contents thereof: and subsequent 
purchasers, mortgagees and lien-
holders shall be deemed to purchase 
and take with notice. 
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It was error for the Lower Court to rule that the 
respondent had no notice of the provisions of the restrictive 
covenants since said notice was imparted by the above-cited 
statute to the respondent. 
The ultimate issue is not one of notice to the 
respondent but whether or not the restrictive covenants at 
issue in this action expired on May 27, 1972, or were ex-
tended by the terms of those covenants until May 27, 1982. 
This issue is treated below. 
Point II 
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS WERE 
CREATED FOR AN INITIAL TWENTY-
FIVE YEAR TERM WHICH ENDED MAY 
12, 1972. A MAJORITY OF THE 
LANDOWNERS SUBJECT TO THOSE 
COVENANTS DID NOT VOTE TO TER-
MINATE THEM PRIOR TO MAY 12, 
19 72, AN.D THE COVENANTS WERE 
THEREBY AUTOMATICALLY EXTENDED· 
FOR TEN YEARS OR UNTIL MAY 12, 
1982. ALTERNATIVELY, A TRIAL 
SHOULD HAVE BEEN HELD TO OBTAIN 
EVIDENCE AS TO THE INTENTIONS OF 
THE ORIGINAL PARTIES TO THE RE-
STRICTIVE COVENANTS. 
The validity or enforceability of the substance 
of the building restrictions (R. pps. 20-22) are not at issue 
in this appeal. This Court upheld covenants which are exactly 
the same as those cited below in the matter of Freeman v. Gee, 
18 Utah 2d 339, 423 P.2d 155 (1967). The issue before this 
-5-
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Court is the time frame that the makers of the restrictive 
covenants intended at the time of the filing on May 12, 194?. 
are: 
The pertinent provisions of the "Building Restrictions' 
(i) 
Each and every lot above-described 
shall be known and is hereby desig-
nated as a "Residential Lot" and no 
structure shall be erected, altered, 
placed or permitted to remain on 
any such "Residential Lot" other 
than one detached single-family 
dwelling not to exceed two stories 
in height and a private garage for 
no more than (3) automobiles. 
(R. p. 20) 
(xiii) 
All covenants and restrictions 
herein stated and set forth shall 
run with the land and shall be bind-
ing on all the parties and persons 
claiming any interest in said resi-
dential lots hereinbefore described 
or any part thereof until twenty-
five (25) years from the date hereof, 
at which time the said covenants 
and restrictions shall be automatically 
extended for successive periods of 
ten (10) years unless, by a vote of a 
majority of the then owners of said 
residential lots, it is agreed to 
change the said covenants in whole 
or in part. (R. p. 22) 
Respondent has admitted in her answer that she 
commenced alterations upon her property for the purpose of 
utilizing the property as a duplex rental unit. (R. p. 11) 
The respondent, and evidently the District court, relied on 
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r 
paragraph (xiv) of the "Building Restrictions" (R. p. 22) 
that the restrictive covenants were not enforceable twenty-
fi ve years from the date of their recordation. This paragraph 
in no way diminishes or prohibits enforcement of the restrictive 
covenants after the initial twenty-five year term. The 
appellants have standing to enforce the restriction on single-
family residences without an express grant of authority as 
is demonstrated by Parrish v. Richards, 8 U.2d 419, 336 P.2d 
122 (1959), and Metropolitan Investment Company v. Sine, 14 
U.2d 36, 376 P.2d 940 (1962). 
The restrictive covenants (R. pps. 20-22) are 
absolutely clear. The initial term was for a period of 
twenty-five years (May 27, 1972) and thereafter was auto-
matically extended for a period of ten years unless a vote 
of a majority of the owners of the residential lots had 
chosen to alter those restrictions. It is conceded that 
no such action has been taken. 
Asswning for the moment that an ambiguity does 
exist in the covenants, the Court must ascertain the in-
tentions of the original parties to the covenants. Parrish 
v. Richard, ~· The intention of Richard Hoyt and Maude 
Hoyt at the time they executed and filed the "Building Re-
strictions" (R. pps. 20-22) was to restrict the use of the 
property in question to single-family residential use. 
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Loganview Subdivision is located immediately west of Foothill 
Drive and 2300 East and north of 1700 South in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Except for the area of Foothill Village to 
the north, the area is utilized for residential dwellings, 
The covenants clearly express an intention that the owners 
of property in Loganview Subdivision retain those many 
benefits attendant to family neighborhoods. The Hoyts did 
provide, in paragraph (xiii) of the covenants, that a majority 
of the landowners might voluntarily choose to alter the 
nature of their neighborhood but that event has not occurred, 
The intention of these "Building Restrictions" 
(R. pps. 20-22) are further buttressed by paragraph (xv) 
which states: 
Invalidation of any one of the covenants 
and restrictions hereinbefore set forth 
by judgment or court order shall in no 
wise affect any of the other provisions 
hereof which shall remain in full force 
and effect until twenty-five years from 
the date hereof subject to automatic 
extension as provided in paragraph (xiii) 
hereof. 
The Hoyts envisioned that if any paragraph in the restrictive 
covenants was ruled invalid, that the remaining provisions 
should remain in full force and effect for the original 
twenty-five year term and be automatically extended for ten-
year periods in the event the landowners did not act to 
remove them. 
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In the rnemorandwn submitted by counsel for the 
respondent before the District Court, counsel for the re-
spondent relies on several cases clearly distinguishable to 
the action pending here. In the matter of Eckard v. Smith, 
527 P.2d 660 (Utah 1972), the action before the court was one 
for specific performance under a first option. While the 
intentions of the parties were important in that matter, the 
case was decided upon the issue that the option to sell was 
a privilege to be exercised only in the event the seller 
desired to convey the real property to the buyer. In that 
action the seller did not choose to convey that property and 
therefore specific performance was denied. In Pitcher v. 
Lauritzen, 18 U.2d 368, 423 P.2d 491 (1967), the seller 
brought an action for the value of hay removed from his 
property and the buyer, in turn, counterclairned for specific 
performance of a "contract" to purchase the property. While 
; 
an earnest money agreement had been executed, no final contract 
had been consummated. Therefore, the court declined to order 
specific performance. It is submitted that these cases do 
not apply to the covenants now before the Court in that these 
covenants represent a clear and final expression of the intent 
of the original makers. 
counsel for respondent also relied upon Parrish v. RichaXdS, 
8 U.2d 419, 336 P.2d 122 (1959), (R. p. 26), mich CXlllllSE!l for cg>e].lants 
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has cited earlier in this brief. In the Parrish action, suit 
was brought to enjoin the maintenance of a tennis court as 
violating a restrictive covenant against other than single-
family dwellings. Counsel for the respondent further set 
forth a portion of the Court's opinion in the Parrish action 
that this Court found: 
The trial court followed the correct 
doctrine that in the construction of 
uncertain or ambiguous restrictions 
the court will resolve all doubts in 
favor of the free and unrestricted 
use of property • • 336 P.2d 123 
(R. p. 26) 
What was deleted from the Court' s opinion was the nec_essi ty 
to analyze the intention of the parties as to the purpose 
of the restrictive coven an ts and the Court, in that portion 
of the opinion deleted by counsel for the respondent, went 
on to state: 
••• and that it will 'have recourse 
to every aid, rule or canon of con-
struction to ascertain the intention 
of the parties'. [Citing Reese Howell 
Company v. Brown, 48 Utah 142, 158 
Pac. 684, 687 (1916)) 
The Lower Court further erred in sununarily ruling 
that the "Building Restrictions" of Loganview Subdivision 
were not enforceable against the respondent since the re-
strictive covenants can only be ruled a nullity if supported 
by clear and convincing evidence. Metropolitan Investmen! 
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company v. Sine, 14 U.2d 419, 376 P.2d 940 (1962). The 
court must take evidence as to the intentions of the 
parties, the purpose of the restriction, and the surrounding 
circumstances of the case, which was no.t done. Metropolitan 
Investment Company v. Sine, supra. 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent had notice, as provided by law, of 
the restrictive covenants in effect as to her property in 
Loganview Subdivision. Twenty-five years subsequent to their 
filing (May 12, 1972), those restrictions were automatically 
extended for a ten-year period (until May 12, 1982) because 
a majority of the landowners did not take affirmative action 
to alter the character of their neighborhood. The surplus 
paragraph in the restrictive covenants giving a cause of 
action to the landowners to enforce the covenants has no 
effect of altering substantive restrictions running with the 
property in that area. 
A trial should be held to determine the intentions 
of the parties who originally executed the restrictive covenants, 
the purpose of the restrictions, and the attendant circmnstances. 
The order of the District Court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~I~ 
ROBERT FELTON 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellants 
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